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For business it's a tough world that's getting
tougher. The reasons are familiar enough: global
competition, deregulation, finicky and tough customers,
concerned and demanding stockholders, and a dizzying pace
of constant change. Rare indeed is the company which has
found a comfortable niche in this chaotic world.
So, the search is on for a competitive advantage,
preferably one that might prove sustainable over some
period of time. Business strategies are being rethought.
Core competencies are being identified or, in many cases,
built from scratch. Reorganization is rampant. staid old
bureaucracies are being dismantled in favor of more nimble,
flexible organizational forms. New technologies and
information systems are being created to harness knowledge
and tie disparate organizational entities together. And,
attention is turning to the human competencies and
capacities it takes to bring these transformed enterprises
to life.
Enter human resource strategy. Backed by a little
theory, a small amount of research, and a lot of old-
fashioned trial and error, many variations of such
strategies are being frequently prescribed and sometimes
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tried in these new business enviror.ments. While there have
been some real success stories, many unanswered questions
remain. The key issues seem clear enough. But, there is
considerable work to be done before it will be possible to
make solid recommendations about employing human resources
as critical success factors in the search for competitive
advantage.
THE THEORY
There are solid theoretical reasons to believe that
competitiveness can be enhanced by more effectively
managing human resources. It is, after all, people who
identify business opportunities, develop products and
services, formulate strategies, make and deliver products
and services to the marketplace, and so forth. When these
tasks are done well, an organization presumably has a
greater probability of success than is the case when they
are not done well. How well these tasks are performed, in
turn, depends in large part on the policies and programs
used to attract, retain, develop, and motivate the numbers
and types of employees an organization needs.
This may seem like human resource business as usual,
3
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but such is not the case. The field has t~aditionally
viewed these activities as essentially independent of each
other and their contexts and has generally been concerned
with operational aspects such as program design and
administration. In recent years, however, there has been a
steady evolution toward a more strategic perspective
(Fombrun, Tichy, and Devanna, 1984j Foulkes, 1986; Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie, 1986; Dyer and Holder, 1988; Ulrich and
Lake, 1990j Walker, 1992).
As a key tenet this perspective begins with the
business rather than with human resource activities.
Somewhat oversimplified (for a fuller explanation, see Dyer
and Holder, 1988, or Walker, 1992), the key pieces are the
business context and human resource strategy (see Figure
1). The basic idea is that changes in the business
context, consisting of business strategy, organizational
structure, and process technology, alone or in combination,
usually give rise to critical human resource issues which
must be dealt with if an organization is to succeed.
Accordingly, the basic tasks are, first, to analyze the
anticipated business context to identify these issues and,
second, to fashion an appropriate human resource strategy
for dealing with them.
4
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Figure 1 About Here
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Human resource strategies layout both goals and the
means for reaching these goals (see Figure 2). Goals
derive from identified issues and can be of many types.
Three of the more common are shown in the inner circle of
Figure 2. Population goals address issues of headcount,
staffing ratios, and skill mix; an example would be Kodak's
announced intention to reduce its u.s. headcount by 20,000
employees. contribution goals relate to individual or
group behaviors or outcomes. Instilling a strong customer
orientatation among a company's employees is one example;
others, very common these days, are achieving desired
improvements in labor productivity and product or service
quality. Morale goals refer to desired levels of employee
commitment to the organization or employee satisfaction.
McDonald's, for example, seeks to make its stores fun
places to work, but would be rather concerned if many of
the (primarily) young people it hires were to adopt a long-
term commitment to the company.
--------------------------
5
--
Figure 2 About Here
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Human resource goals are reached through a combination
or bundle of human resource activities of the sort depicted
in the middle and outer circles of Figure 2. The exact
nature of the package is determined not only by the goals
to be achieved, but also by the nature of the external and
internal environments decision-makers face (refer again to
Figure 1). General Motors, for example, may seek to
improve employee productivity and product quality through
creative work and reward systems, but can only do so if the
desired changes can be negotiated or otherwise worked out
with the UAW.
A key concept in the strategic perspective is "fit".
Internal fit refers to the degree of coherency or synergy
among the various human resource activities that make up
the strategy. External fit refers to the degree of
consistency between a human resource strategy on the one
hand and the business context on the other. The basic
propositions around which the strategic perspective is
framed can be stated as follows: (l) human resource
6
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strategies that exhibit internal fit are more effective
than those that do not in terms of meeting human resource
goals and (2) human resource strategies that exhibit both
internal and external fit are more effective than those
that do not in contributing to organizational effectiveness
or competitiveness.
SOME EVIDENCE
The strategic perspective of human resource management
is beginning to attract interest among researchers from
various disciplines. Generally, the studies are of three
major types.
One addresses the issue of internal fit -- often in
the interest of developing typologies of human resource
strategies -- and, occasionally, tests for covariation
between the typologies uncovered and one or more aspects of
the business context, usually business strategy. Case
studies, for example, have unearthed several examples of
human resource strategies with enough internal consistency
to yield a plausible typology (see Dyer and Holder, 1988).
Some surveys have, too (e.g., Arthur, 1992), although more
extensive surveys (e.g., Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford,
7
-
1992; Osterman, in press) suggest that internally
consistent models may not be very widely diffused either
within or across organizations.
There is some evidence supporting covariation (e.g.,
Arthur, 1992; Snell and Dean, 1992), although the strength
of the relationships are weak and inconsistent enough to
eschew a theory of determinism in favor of a role for the
concept of strategic choice (Kochan, et aI, 1986). And at
any rate, while these studies are intriguing, they are only
tangentially related to the central propositions of the
strategic perspective since they basically treat human
resource strategy as a dependent rather than an independent
variable.
More to the point are studies which have found fairly
consistent relationships between bundles of human resource
activities and one or more measures of human resource or
organizational outcomes (e.g., Ichniowski, 1991; Huselid,
1993) . Even mor, to the point is a very recent study by
Ichniowski, Shaw, and pressushi (1993) which involves
longitudinal data from several steel mills and which finds
that "systems of complementary HRM practices" produce
significantly greater productivity and quality effects than
8
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do any particular human resource practice considered alone.
A third approach approach to research more directly
addresses the issue of external fit. But, alas, the
studies are few and the results thus far are inconclusive.
Data from a sample of steel minimills found that mills with
external fit (those that had cost-driven business
strategies matched with cost reducing human resource
strategies or differentiation business strategies matched
with commitment maximizing human resource strategies)
outperformed mills that lacked external fit in terms of
productivity and quality. But, several mills could not be
conveniently classified in terms of either their business
or human resource strategies so the sample size for this
particular analysis was too small to yield statistically
significant results (Arthur, 1990). The well-known MIT
auto industry studil s, which use large international
samples of assembly plants, have found that so-called lean
production systems consistently out-perform traditional
mass production systems in terms of productivity and
quality even though both are characterized by a high degree
of external fit (e.g., MacDuffie and Krafcik, 1992).
So, predictably, more research is needed. Especially
9
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important are studies which directly test the central
propositions of the strategic perspective. Also important
are studies involving additional industries and employee
groups. Most of the evidence so far comes from heavy
industries -- primarily, autos and steel -- and involves
only blue-collar workers. Third, it would be helpful to
expand the range of dependent variables beyond productivity
and quality.
These recommendations are particularly salient given
the significant shifts in strategic contexts and employment
patterns which are taking place in the u.s. economy.
THE EVOLVI~G BUSINESS CONTEXT
Business contexts are in a constant state of flux.
The challenge, of course, is to make certain that new
formulations of human resource strategies are both relevant
to and properly tested in the prevailing and emerging
contexts. While it is impossible to capture the full
panoply of current and anticipated developments, a few
generalizations can be made.
Production driven business strategies emphasizing high
10
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volume, low cost, and perhaps quality continue to give way
te customer-driven strategies which additionally focus on
speed, flexibility and adaptability to customer needs,
and/or product and service innovations. Disappearing as
well are pyramidal organizational structures with
functional silos and sharp divisions of labor. These are
giving way to flatter, more networked structures focused on
a narrow set of what are coming to be called core
competencies (with much of the more peripheral work being
outsourced) . In manufacturing, mass production
technologies featuring long production runs and ample
buffers of raw materials and goods in progress are yielding
to more flexible, highly computerized systems with just-in-
time inventories supported by sophisticated information
systems which provide direct linkages to key suppliers and
major customers. In services, new technologies make it
possible for highly decentralized operations to function
close to their customers with a level of consistency
p!eviously impossible. In the process entire industries --
for example, mass retailing -- are being transformed.
As these developments become better understood they
give rise to new paradigms of business contexts. In
manufacturing, for example, there is lean and flexible
11
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production (MacDuffie and Krafcik, 1992). In the
increasingly dominant service sector, which now accounts
for over three-quarters of the jobs in the U.S., there are
several. In his path-breaking book, Intelliqent
Enterprise, James Bryan Quinn (1992), drawing on the work
of Henry Mintzberg and others, delineates three basic
paradigms: mass service such as Walmart, the airlines, and
commercial banks; professional bureaucracies such as
hospitals, consulting firms, and univ'_sities; and
adhocracies such as software houses, construction firms,
and investment banks. Each type has a prototypical
approach to business strategy, structure, and especially
technology applications, with numerous variations around
the basic themes.
Success in these new manufacturing and service
environments depends in large measure on the intelligent
management of human resources (Quinn calls this "leveraging
intellect"). Knowledge is the organizations' stock in
trade, and much of the critical knowledge walks out the
door every night and, it is hoped, back in the next day.
Prototypical employees are no longer sweating proletariats
on an assembly line, but rather harried clerks struggling
to please enigmatic customers on a sales floor and frenetic
12
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technical and professional employees (the new technocrats)
watching over electronic panels in air-conditioned control
rooms or agonizing over clients' intractible problems in
private conference rooms.
These patterns are becoming more discernible. Human
resource strategists are struggling to keep pace.
TOWARD NEW HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGIES
Most of the current work in human resource strategy
focuses on the enhancement of employee contribution or
performance. And most of this work has philosophical roots
in the recurring notion of employee involvement (or, more
recently, empowerment). Two streams of thought can be
teased from the clutter of experimentation and exhortation,
although these are clearly cleaner in concept than in
practice (Appelbaum and Batt, 1993). In fact, the two are
generally quite similar on most dimensions of human
resource strategy; their main differences pertain to work
design (Lawler, et aI, 1992).
THE MODELS
13
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~The first approach, associated with lean production in
the auto industry and with the total quality movement
(symbolized by the criteria of the Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Award), is basically a top-down system.
Jobs tend to be standardized or, perhaps, moderately
enriched. Employee involvement occurs through parallel
suggestion systems and/or what is called job involvement;
that is, through extra-organizational quality circles or
quality improvement teams on the one hand and/or employee
control over improvements in work methods and techniques
(but not larger issues) on the other (Lawler, 1988). In
this approach, status and power clearly reside with
management; only rather constrained and limited authority
to make recommendations or to take action is delegated to
lower-level employees. Management, therefore, is asked to
make only modest adjustments in the traditional top-down
style, although this can lead to the somewhat anomolous
situation of, in effect, attempting to mandate
participation (Appelbaum and Batt, 1993).
The second approach to work design -- the high
involvement model -- traces its intellectual roots back to
the sixties (McGregor, 1960; Likert, 1967), but receives
its major boost from more recent models developed by Walton
(1985) and Lawler (1986, 1988, 1992), among others. Here,
14
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employees rather than managers design the work -- that is,
the approach is more bottom-up in orientation -- using
principles of job enrichment and, quite commonly, employing
semi-autonomous or even autonomous (i.e., self-managing)
work teams. within broad guidelines, these teams decide on
work goals, priorities, job assignments, quality controls,
and, in advanced cases, such personnel matters as hiring,
training, and discipline. Additionally, cross-functional,
cross-level teams or committees (sometimes including labor
union leaders as, for example, at Saturn) are employed to
provide input into or even to decide on broader
organizational issues such as customer and supplier
relations, overall productivity and quality goals,
comprehensive work processes (e.g., reengineering), human
resource policies, and purchases of capital equipment.
While work design is central, contribution-focused
human resource strategies contain other important
components including supervision, rewards, training, and
employment stability.
Both approaches, for example, decree that supervision
should be more facilitative than directive. In the high
involvement version, where this issue is particularly
15
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critical, it is usually facilitated by flattening
organizational structures thereby expanding supervisory
spans of support (ne control) to the point where a
directive style is virtually impossible to maintain.
Some models of total quality management (e.g., Deming,
1986) caution against the use of contingent rewards, but in
practice both the limited and high involvement models tend
to move in the direction of including pay increases,
bonuses or awards based on performance, especially work
group and/or organizational performance (Lawler, et aI,
1992) . The high involvement model also advocates and
sometimes uses skill-based pay to encourage employees to
learn a variety of tasks, thus enhancing their versatility
as team members.
Both the limited and high involvement models also
require significant investments in training since
involvement and facilitation are often missing from the
behavioral repertoires of employees and supervisors. This
almost always includes significantly more technical
training (in, for example, statistical process control).
Where teams are used, training in so-called "softer"
16
subjects such as group problem-solving and decision-making
and interp~rsonal skills is usually also necessary.
Broader teams or committees may also receive training (or
even basic education) in business economics, finance,
organizational behavior, and change management.
Finally, both models expressly stress the importance
of employment stability (although, as we shall see, this
can be the achilles heel of these approaches). Unless
layoffs and terminations are eliminated, or at least
minimized, the argument goes, trust is destroyed, extensive
investments in relationship building and training are lost,
and, most important, employees will refrain from making
making maximum contributions for fear of working themselves
or their peers out of their jobs.
THE. TASK ItHEAD
This brief review of extant models suggests several
avenues for further work.
* Despite a plethora of practices and
17
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literature (again, see Appelbaum and Batt, 1993
for a review), much of the more comprehensive and
internally consistent work has coalesced around a
couple of basic models. And these are more
similar than different in philosophy, concept,
and design. Surely, a wider range of
possibilities needs to be explored (Dyer and
Holder, 1988).
*
Existing models are strong on internal
fit, in theory if not always in
practice, but give only a passing nod
to the issue of external fit.
Advocates make the basic assumption
that their models of choice are the
"one best way" to manage in today's
business contexts. This is an
assumption much in need of questioning,
.and testing.
* A good deal of the organizational
action in recent years has focused on
what was earlier called population.
Corporations in the U.S., in the
18
,I
!
I
~
I
J.-
process of delayering and downsizing, for
example, have cut their populations by millions
of employees at all levels. For this reason, and
others, a number of companies (e.g., IBM) have as
a major goal the restoration of employee morale.
Yet, existing models of human resource strategy
overwhelmingly focus on employee contribution or
performance. Clearly, there is a need for a
broader view.
* Many models -- e.g., lean production --
are explicitly designed to apply to
blue-collar employees in manufacturing
environments. others -- e.g., Lawler's
high involvement model -- are less
explicit as to target group, but are
clearly biased toward lower-level
employees. With manufacturing
employment in secular decline and
professional and technical employment
in ascendency (Quinn, 1992; Drucker,
1993), additional models may well be
required. Does it make sense, for
example, to speak of empowering
19
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employees who, by virtue of their knowledge of
and access to key technologies, are in a position
to totally sabotage major operations in their
organizations -- often by simply walking out the
door?
NAGGING PROBLEMS AND DOUBTS:
AN ILLUSTRATION
By way of conclusion, a brief exposition is used to
illustrate the full dimensions of the aforementioned tasks
which lie ahead.
Recently, the Center for Advanced Human Resource
Studies at Cornell University conducted a modified Delphi
study designed to ascertain key features of the workplace
in the year 2000. Fifty-seven panelists, representing
business, consulting firms, labor unions, and academia,
provided comprehensive information through three rounds of
data collection. Responses were anchored in a specific
firm representing (in retrospect) a cross between Quinn's
(1992) mass service firms and professional bureaucracies.
The questions covered the full range of human resource
strategy -- population, contribution, and morale; most
20
asked for comparisons between data supplied for 1991 and
respondents predictions (not preferences) for the year 2000
and for separate responses across four key employee groups:
executives, managers, professional and technical employees,
and support staff. Here, for illustrative purposes, the
focus in on professional and technical employees -- the new
technocrats. (And only selected results are presented for
this group; for the whole story, see Dyer and Blancero,
1992).
THE HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY
Patterns in the panelists' answers constitue a
descriptive (again, not prescriptive) human resource
strategy for, in this case, the professional and technical
employees of this particular service firm in the year 2000.
The results are presented in terms of the three dimensions
proviously discussed: contribution first, followed by
population and morale.
Contribution
The panelists pictured an organization struggling
simultaneously to optimize several critical dimensions of
I-i
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performance: productivity, quality, speed (i.e., cycle
time) and innovation. The firm's standards, or
expectations, were depicted as being very high on all four
dimensions.
Professional and technical employees (unlike the other
employee groups) would do most of their work in teams.
About half of the teams would be permanent, while the rest
would be ad hoc. Most would be multi-functional, multi-
level, and semi-autonomous (with a few being self-
directed). Notwithstanding the team set-up, decision-
making around strategy and policy, performance goals, and
work task allocation would remain primarily the province of
executives and managers. Professional and technical
employees would be somewhat involved in setting unit or
team performance goals and allocating work tasks among team
members, but would be very deeply involved only when it
,
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came to day-to-day problem-solving at the workplace.
Managers would also dominate most personnel decisions --
hiring, setting individual performance goals, assessing
performance, and the like -- with significant involvement
by professional and technical employees only with respect
to training.
22
Man&gers, in their supervisory roles would be more
supportive than directive or controlling. They would, as
noted, have primary responsibility for appraising the
performance of professional and technical employees, with
some input being provided by peers, presumably reflecting
the tendency to work in teams. Unlike Quinn (1992), the
panelists foresaw little direct evaluation of these
employees by such "outsiders" as customers and suppliers.
Performance feedback would be pervasive; the new
technocrats would know exactly where they stood with
respect to judgments about their performance,
promotability, and long-term career potential.
Pay would be split into a fixed (i.e., salaries with
annual increases that fold into the base) and variable
(i.e., "at risk" bonuses that must be regularly re-earned).
Base salary would depend on job level, with periodic
increases being determined on the basis of work group
performance, individual contributions to work group
performance, and skill acquisition. On average, 18 percent
of total earnings would be "at risk" (compared with 10
percent in 1991), with the actual amount of the bonus being
based on work group performance and individual
contributions to work group performance.
23
Total organizational expenditures for training would
run about 3.5 percent of payroll (compared with 1.4 percent
in 1991). Just over one-fourth of the dollars would be
spent on professional and technical employees; an increase
of 20 percent over 1991. On a per capita basis, however,
far fewer training dollars would be spent on these
empolyees than on either executives or managers. Most
professional and technical training would take place on the
job, although there would also be liberal use of formal
classroom training, special assignments within the company,
and educational leaves.
The firm would offer only limited employment
stability, as we shall see.
In sum, the panelists foresaw that the new technocrats
I
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would labor in a work system more closely approximating the
limited involvement than the high involvement model.
Managerial decision-making authority, except at the
immediate work site, would remain essentially intact.
Consistent with additional tenets of the involvement model,
contribution would be encouraged through supportive
supervision and performance based pay and facilitated by
increased (although less than proportionate) expenditures
24
for training and development. Inconsistent with a
fundamental tenet of this model, however, is the projected
lack of employment stability.
Population
Professional and technical employees would constitute
the fastest growing and, indeed, dominant employee group.
Their share of total employment was projected to increase
from 33 percent in 1991 to 43 percent in 2000; this is a 68
percent increase, more than double the 29 percent increase
in total employment. (Managers were the big losers --
their share of total employment was expected to decline
from 30 percent to 22 percent during the decade).
Only about two-thirds of this rapidly growing group,
however, would be regular full-time employees. The rest,
would be so-called contingent employees (Belous1 1989),
about one-half of whom would work part-time, while the
remaining would be temporary or contract employees working
either part- or full-time.
Promotional opportunities among the core (i.e.,
regular fUll-time) professional and technical employees
25
were expected to decrease by 17 percent between 1991 and
2000. This reflects the increasing reliance on contingent
employees, as well as a sharp reduction in the number of
hierarchical levels in the organization and a general drift
away from a policy of promotion from within (43 percent of
all vacancies in the professional and technical ranks in
2000 would be filled from outside the company).
About,60 percent of the core professional and
technical employees were expected to spend the bulk of
their careers with the company. This is down 21 percent
from 1991. Voluntary attrition would take its toll, but,
in addition, the panelists projected a greater reliance on
outplacement assistance and severance and early retirement
packages to weed out those employees who had become
marginal performers or whose skills no longer matched the
company's need.
with respect to population, then, the picture that
emerges is consistent with what has come to be called
strategic or flexible staffing (Walker, 1992). Overall
headcount would be tightly controlled, with additions being
made in a focused way -- that is, by adding mostly
professional and technical employees who primarily do
26
value-added work of direct relevance to the firm1s
customers. Many of these additions would be contingent
rather than core employees. Further, fewer of the core
employees would have a long-term attachment to the company,
partly because they would be voluntarily seeking greener
pastures and partly because the company would be
systematically purging those whose contributions or skills
no longer fit.
Morale
The panelists apparently sensed that the foregoing
policies and practices would likely alter the companyls
implied contract (Rousseau, 1989) with its professional and
technical employees. They were not moved to the point of
projecting unionization among these employees, however.
Instead, they offered up a potpourri of employee relations
activities and techniques. Most professional and technical
employees would work flexible hours and about one-seventh
would work at home most of the time. There would be
significant managerial communications with employees,
various "voice" mechanisms (for employees to use in
expressing their opinions and concerns up the hierarchy),
child-care and elder-care subsidies and referrals, paid
27
parental leaves, wellness and fitness programs, an employee
assistance programs, and a due process (grievance)
procedure.
THE RESULTS
How would it all add up? To what extent did the
panelists expect that the challenge of working in teams on
significant workplace issues with supportive supervision,
rewards commensurate with contribution, and extensive
training, and a bagful of supportive employee relations
activities might offset, or be offset by, tough performance
standards, potentially potent peer pressure, "at risk"
emploYment and pay, a bagful of supportive employee
relations activities, and the presence of a small army of
contingent employees?
Clues are provided by the panelists projections
regarding the following motivational and performance
results (all ratings were on a 5-point scale, with 5 being
high) : sense of challenge (3.7), sense of empowerment
(3.6), commitment to work (3.7), motivation (3.7), and
overall performance (3.9). Additional information comes
from their expectations regarding morale: level of stress
28
(3.7): sense of employment security (2.7), loyalty to the
company (3.0) and satisfaction with work (3.9), with co-
workers (3.8), with supervision (3.6), with pay (3.3), and
with career (3.1).
In brief, the panelists seemed to sense a fundamental
quandary: the need to enhance the contribution of
employees on the one hand coupled with a need to control
costs, especially labor costs, on the other. To control
costs they focused primarily on population, opting for
flexibility; in part by keeping open the option of
churning the cadre of core employees and in part by
employing a sizable group of contingent employees.
Secondarily, they built in down-side flexibility in wage
outlays by adopting a modest variable compensation scheme.
To elicit required levels of contribution from this
population of potentially short-term and basically insecure
employees, the panelists leaned toward teams and employee
involvement (as opposed to, say, Taylorism) and two forms
of performance-based pay. But, they stopped short, for
whatever reasons, of endorsing either a high involvement
system or a full-blown inducement strategy (Dyer and
Holder, 1988). Further, they followed this path apparently
29
at least implicitly aware of the fact that their middle-of-
the-road approach to contribution, coupled with a plethora
of employee relations activities, would be inadequate to
offset the debilitating effects of the intense focus on
cost control on the population side.
CONCLUSION
This is not to condemn the panelists. Rather, it is
to highlight the need for theorists, researchers, and
practitioners to develop a fuller range of human resource
strategies, taking into account the need to manage
population and morale, as well as contribution, and the
significant swing toward service-oriented businesses
increasingly populated by potentially powerful professional
and technical employees. In the end, the panelists simply
demonstrated, in their own way, the magnitude of the
challenges we face.
30
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